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Despite the rise of multiparty democracy, many African governments still 
struggle to control corruption and to improve the legitimacy of the state. To 
promote better governance, international development assistance supports 
ambitious reform agendas and idealistic models of governance. However, 
these programmes and interventions frequently misunderstand the realities 
of governance in weak and fragile states.
 • Corruption and patronage are usually not clandestine, but highly visible. It is
not a lack of information or awareness that keeps citizens from holding their
governments accountable, but a lack of effective and legitimate channels for
public dissent. In many countries, elite networks continue to protect their
members as they violate laws – and also expect them to bend formal rules to
advance the interests of their group.
 • Public participation can only contribute to government legitimacy if it has a 
genuine impact on political decisions. However this is often not the case, be-
cause elites have little to gain from building political consensus or aggregating 
competing interests into collectively rational decisions.
 • Decentralisation reforms result in the proliferation of local-level institutions,
but fail to bring the state closer to the people. Most African states have never
had strong control over peripheral territories, and have relied on informal gate-
keepers and traditional authorities to access local populations. Neither central
governments nor local gatekeepers have strong incentives to cede real authority 
to local-level political institutions.
Policy Implications
Well-intentioned reform programmes fail to have the desired effects, because 
they attempt to change the political reality to conform to idealised conceptions of 
governance. Governance reforms might be more successful if they focus instead 
on reducing the contradictions between formal institutions and informal prac-
tices in weak and fragile states. To this end, development organisations should 
actively engage in research and innovation.
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For international development assistance, promoting good governance is one of the 
top priorities in Africa. More than in any other region of the world, fragile public 
institutions, rampant bureaucratic corruption, and the problematic legitimacy of 
governments all impede the provision of essential public goods and services. yet, 
despite significant reform efforts in many countries, the continent as a whole trails 
other world regions on measures of corruption and state fragility. Are governance 
failures in Africa simply intractable, or do we have the wrong ideas on how to fix 
them? 
This contribution will critically examine three powerful, recurring ideas about 
governance failures in Africa to which numerous international development organi-
sations have subscribed in one way or another: (1) that greater transparency will 
reduce corruption; (2) that the legitimacy of state institutions can be increased by 
promoting citizen participation; and, (3) that decentralisation reform brings gov-
ernment “closer to the people.” Proponents of these ideas understand the failure 
of states to provide public services as a failure of accountability. Public service 
 providers (such as schools, health services, and local administrations) are insuf-
ficiently monitored, citizens lack “client power” over these service providers – or 
ways of holding politicians accountable for overseeing service providers. originally 
popularised by the 2004 World Development Report, the underlying concept is that 
of a “triangle of accountability”: elected politicians supervise a bureaucracy that 
provides services to citizens. Citizens hold service providers accountable by  voicing 
concerns to politicians (the “long route of accountability”), or by exerting client 
power over service providers (the “short route of accountability”) (World Bank 
2003: 32). Information asymmetries between citizens and politicians and politi-
cians and service providers are assumed to be among the root causes of governance 
failures. This emphasis on accountability problems has guided the design of reform 
projects, development programmes, and non-governmental organisation initiatives 
to promote better governance. However, the impact of these types of interventions 
lags far behind the idealistic visions of governance that motivate them in the first 
place. Why? 
In the context of African politics, problems of governance run much deeper 
than ensuring the accountability of the public sector. Many states lack societal 
backing and legitimacy, and this has fundamental consequences for how they 
 operate  (Englebert 2009). As scholars of African politics have argued, political 
power is not derived from the formal institutions of the state nor is it legitimised 
by the provision of public services (Bratton and van de Walle 1994: 458ff.). Instead, 
 patron–client networks – often organised along ethnic community lines – function 
as the main sources of political power (Hyden 2012; Lemarchand and Legg 1972). 
 Patronage sustains the social influence, prestige, and negotiating capital of elites, 
and is used to co-opt political challengers (Arriola 2009). Informal social relation-
ships are integral to governance processes, and so are the social norms and princi-
ples that govern them. 
Promoting better governance in weak and fragile states thus poses a different 
set of challenges than it does in countries with strong state institutions, where gov-
ernance failures can be addressed by identifying and addressing formal account-
ability deficits. Above all, it is necessary to keep in mind that modifying formal 
rules is not sufficient to change the behaviour of public decision makers if they are 
not the main constraint on their choices. Political and administrative elites rely 
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on formal laws and institutions where it is opportune to do so, but, by themselves, 
rules and institutions are often far from being self-enforcing. Political authority 
remains highly personalised, and the boundaries between the public and private 
realms are blurred. Politicians and public servants rely on face-to-face  reciprocities 
to get things done (Hyden 2012: 74), and by doing so become entangled in a web of 
conflicting formal responsibilities, material interests, and interpersonal  loyalties. 
Reforms that focus on the formal institutions alone, without changing the  informal 
norms and obligations that shape the behaviour of officeholders as well as the expec-
ta tions of citizens, tend to remain perfunctory. unfortunately, this awareness has 
been lacking in many donor-led attempts to promote governance reform or  develop 
the capacity of state institutions in Africa. 
To make this point, this contribution critically examines three widespread as-
sumptions that have frequently been adopted by development organisations seeking 
to promote better governance and public service provision in Africa: 
 • “Greater transparency will reduce corruption”
 • “Promoting citizen participation will increase the legitimacy of state institutions”
 • “Decentralisation brings the state closer to the people”
It concludes by calling for a more realistic approach to governance reforms. This 
modified approach should first and foremost seek to understand the informal norms 
and social expectations vis-à-vis public decision makers, prior to conceptualising 
institutional solutions to governance failures.   
“Greater Transparency Will Reduce Corruption”
Transparency initiatives rank highly on the priority list of anti-corruption efforts. 
It is, however, important to distinguish between two different goals in  transparency 
initiatives: deterring foreign corrupt practices by international corporations and 
increasing the domestic accountability of public decision makers. Growing law 
 enforcement against foreign corrupt practices has become an effective deterrent for 
international corporations in organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) countries. However, efforts to increase domestic accountability re-
garding corruption in African countries remain troubled at every level. 
The list of corruption scandals in Africa is substantial. often enough, however, 
even high-profile international attention fails to result in actual consequences. A 
famous example is the “BAE Systems scandal” in Tanzania. In an obvious case of 
corruption among top-level decision makers in Tanzania, the British defence com-
pany BAE Systems secured an inflated contract for a radar defence system for which 
no obvious military need existed. An investigation by the united Kingdom’s Serious 
Fraud Office resulted in legal consequences for BAE Systems, who were ordered 
to pay GBP 30 million in compensation to the Tanzanian people. While the gov-
ernment gladly accepted the compensation on behalf of “the people,” Tanzania’s 
chief anti-corruption officer cynically claimed that “no Tanzanian was involved in 
the scandal” (Heritage 2012). The case illustrates that while transparency may be 
helpful in protecting against foreign corrupt practices, domestic accountability is 
lacking even in such blatant, highly publicised corruption scandals. Why, then, do 
public scrutiny and international attention remain so inconsequential? 
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What is often misunderstood is that, in many Africa countries, corruption is 
generally not clandestine or hidden from society. Instead, it is rather conspicuous. 
This not only includes grand corruption, such as fraudulent government contracts, 
but also petty corruption such as the collection of bribes by police or low-level admini-
strators, or the misappropriation of food aid or agricultural subsidy  vouchers by 
village leaders (Lierl 2018). Petty corruption is experienced by millions of  citizens 
as part of their everyday lives. 
An implicit assumption of transparency initiatives is that citizens are lacking 
information on corruption, and if they were made aware of the practice or of  deficits 
in government performance then they would act collectively to pressure state insti-
tutions. However, the overwhelming precedent is that public decision makers do 
not have to fear legal consequences and can get away with corruption as long as 
they stay in the good graces of their supporters. Ethnographic research has long 
provided examples, pointing to a remarkable tolerance for corruption  (Ensminger 
2012; olivier de Sardan 1999; Platteau and Gaspart 2003) – as have behavioural 
experiments with citizens and public decision makers (Lierl 2015, 2018, 2019). 
Likewise, research on the electoral consequences of information campaigns in 
 Africa highlights that changes in voters’ beliefs about the quality of politicians do 
not generally precipitate ones in their voting behaviour (Bhandari, Larreguy, and 
Marshall 2019; Lierl and Holmlund 2019). Further, voters’ interpretation of such 
information is contingent on other social factors – such as whether a politician is a 
co-ethnic (Adida et al. 2017). 
To the extent that one can generalise from the existing evidence, it is not for 
a lack of public information and evidence that African states fail to prosecute and 
punish corruption. Conversely, it is not a shortfall of awareness that keeps citi-
zens from holding their politicians accountable. Instead, citizens’ expectations to-
wards the state tend to be low. As the 2016/18 Afrobarometer surveys suggest, in 
many countries citizens do not expect that reporting corruption would result in any 
kind of response (for example, only 8 per cent in Nigeria, 12 per cent in Kenya, or 
20 per cent of respondents in countries like Ghana or South Africa consider this to 
be very likely). Citizens who experience a weak and dysfunctional state are unlikely 
to resort to formal institutions and political mechanisms to seek redress for their 
grievances. This may be the main reason why transparency initiatives that primarily 
supply information to citizens and civil society have few successes to show for their 
work. Information supplied to citizens may not be that which they demand, and the 
actions for which it would be helpful may not be the ones that citizens themselves 
would choose to take. 
The conspicuousness of corruption in many African states and continued im-
punity imply that policymakers should re-think the assumed causality between 
transparency and corruption. Deliberate transparency efforts are adopted if public 
decision makers are not planning to engage in corruption anyway, and expect to 
benefit from showing this. If the circumstances are right, it is easy to envision a vir-
tuous cycle of decreasing corruption and increasing transparency and public trust. 
However, a lack of transparency is not the reason why corruption persists in many 
African states. The causes must be sought rather in the social acceptance of cor-
ruption and in the expectations that political decision makers are confronted with. 
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“Promoting Citizen Participation Will Increase the Legitimacy of 
State Institutions”
In a special paper on Promoting Resilient States and Constructive State–Society Re-
lations, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and  Development 
claims that: “Promoting political involvement strengthens the legitimacy of state insti-
tutions and the democratic accountability of political players” (BMZ 2009: 3).  The 
paper further argues that political involvement “makes the actions of government 
and public administration more transparent, strengthens checks and balances, and 
allows effective action to be taken against corruption, arbitrary state rule, and abuse 
of power” (ibid.). This widely held belief is the basis of a whole class of development 
interventions designed to increase citizen participation in governance. These pro-
grammes come in a variety of shapes and forms, including participatory budgeting, 
community-driven development, community monitoring of public services, as well 
as the promotion of civil society organisations (CSos) and support for closer coor-
dination between civil society groups.  
While the contested legitimacy of many African states is undisputed, it would 
be wrong to think that it is caused by weak civil society or insufficient civic partici-
pation. Much more important here is the fact that civic participation is unlikely to 
have political consequences. The majority of African political systems do not offer 
efficient, cooperative ways of including different interest groups in public decision-
making. Even in competitive, multiparty democracies such as Benin, Ghana, or 
Senegal, political parties overwhelmingly rely on clientelistic mobilisation strate-
gies – at the expense of programmatic politics and collective interest articulation. 
Political clientelism is even more fundamental to ethnically polarised political sys-
tems, such as Kenya, and to single-party-dominated systems, such as South Africa. 
While power-sharing among different ethnic groups is common in African politics 
(Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015), it usually is the result of elite-level bargains 
rather than a sign of political inclusiveness. Clientelism and ethnic polarisation 
cause state institutions to serve and burden different groups in society unequally. 
This unfair allocation of the costs and benefits of government actions lies at the 
heart of the legitimacy crisis of African states. It is not for a lack of opportunities for 
political participation that citizens are estranged from the state, but due rather to 
the low likelihood that participation would make a difference in a political system 
that is organised along clientelistic structures. 
The problem of political clientelism is compounded by the lack of a political  culture 
of public dissent. Despite the young demographic majority in Africa,  political  systems 
there remain organised along the values of subordination to elders and authori-
ties – ones which have been cultivated during decades of authoritarianism. For all 
except the most courageous of journalists and civil society leaders, publicly aired 
dissent is often socially or politically inopportune. For individual citizens, their own 
and their family’s relationships with authorities are vitally important. Risking the 
well-being of one’s family by publicly confronting authority figures can be irrespon-
sible, even if there is no overt repression. under these circumstances, political dis-
sent is rarely expressed through individual participation in public affairs. Political 
contention is more likely to occur in the form of protests or riots, where individual 
protesters are protected by the crowd. Participatory governance mechanisms are 
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designed on the assumption that citizens will freely express their concerns and be 
listened to. This may be an unrealistic expectation, however. 
A third issue that limits the effectiveness of participatory approaches to gov-
ernance aiming at increasing public legitimacy is their inability to engender true 
political representation. Decades of foreign assistance have left their mark on civil 
society in many African countries. Down to the grass-roots level, there are an abun-
dance of non-profits and CSOs that exist mainly as platforms for acquiring lucrative 
contracts from the government as well as from development agencies, or as launch 
pads for political careers. For obvious reasons, these types of CSos and their mem-
bers are particularly eager to take part in donor-driven “participatory” interven-
tions. yet, even if they are descriptively representative of society or of marginalised 
groups, they cannot be understood as faithful representatives of collective interests. 
Consequently, their involvement in political decisions will do little to increase the 
trust of the remainder of the population that their needs and views have genuinely 
been taken into consideration. 
Finally, besides their questionable impact on state legitimacy, interventions to 
promote citizen participation in politics tend to have significant practical risks and 
downsides to them too. It is costly to establish institutional structures for citizen 
participation – for example, public forums in the context of participatory  budgeting 
or community-driven development – or community monitoring committees. These 
structures are often not sustainable on their own, and tend to fall apart if external 
funding is withdrawn (Mansuri and Rao 2012). During their short-lived existence, 
participatory governance mechanisms are vulnerable to capture and corruption 
by local elites. If self-motivation among citizens to be involved is weak, they are 
all too often paid or coerced by local authorities to participate – that in order to 
satisfy the demands of external donors or of the government. As a consequence, 
 participatory approaches can easily become more of a burden for citizens than they 
are an  opportunity to voice their views. 
For all of these reasons, participatory governance mechanisms and civil society 
involvement in government affairs are seldom a serious concern for political leaders 
in Africa. Politicians there are willing to go along with foreign donors’ demands for 
citizen participation, knowing that their true sources of political power are mostly 
unaffected by it. Since externally promoted citizen participation does not generate 
serious threats to the political status quo, it is, in practice, unlikely to amount to 
more than mere window dressing. 
“Decentralisation Brings the Government Closer to the People”
In the late 1990s and early years of the new century, a wave of decentralisation  reforms 
spread across Africa. Foreign aid donors and multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank were enticed by the idea of creating independent local institutions 
that would manage public funds autonomously and deliver basic public services to 
the population. Decentralisation would allow donors to finance local-level  public 
 services directly, bypassing central government structures that were perceived as 
corrupt, inefficient, and sometimes undemocratic too. Above all, advocates of decen-
tralisation believed in its potential to increase public accountability. Decentralised 
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governments were believed to be “closer to the people” and better informed about 
local needs (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000). 
Decentralisation reforms devolved central government powers to newly created 
local-level institutions, such as mayors and local councils. Through local elections 
and a variety of consultative forums, typically connected to the elaboration of local 
development plans and annual investment decisions, the new institutional frame-
work was supposed to give rise to a democratic process at the local level. Citizens, 
CSos, and public service providers would articulate their demands to local decision 
makers, and demand accountability from them. Local governments, empowered to 
raise local taxes and entitled to regular fiscal transfers from the state, would be 
responsible for providing essential public services such as primary education and 
healthcare, water and sanitation, as well as local infrastructure. Elected representa-
tives would oversee local administrations and service providers meanwhile. 
The institutional design of decentralisation reforms in Africa followed  similar 
templates in most countries (Dickovick and Riedl 2014). For example, in  former 
French colonies, concepts of France’s decentralisation reform in 1982 were  replicated. 
“Best practices” advocated for by international donors were copied from country to 
country as decentralisation reforms spread across the continent. Almost identical 
decentralisation-support projects were financed by donors in different countries, 
and ensured that it was carried out in very similar ways. Despite their respectable 
intentions, the institutional design of decentralisation reforms had three concep-
tual shortcomings to it. 
First, in areas where central governments had limited presence prior to decen-
tralisation there was very little actual authority to be transferred to local institu-
tions. Throughout their colonial and postcolonial histories, many African states 
have depended on local gatekeepers to implement policies and enforce the law in 
peripheral areas and among minority communities (Boone 2003). In only a few 
countries – including Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Tanzania – does the reach of state 
 bureaucracies extend right down to rural villages without the need for formal or 
informal intermediaries. This can largely attributed to these countries’ unique his-
torical experiences, such as Tanzania’s forced “villagisation” policy in the 1970s. 
In many other African countries, traditional authorities have retained their role 
as gatekeepers to local populations (Baldwin 2016) – or alternative and concur-
rent classes of gatekeepers have emerged, including ethnic leaders, warlords,  local 
 power brokers, or parliamentarians in their respective constituencies (Lindberg 
2010). To work in rural villages or peripheral areas, central government agents rou-
tinely needed the consent and cooperation of local gatekeepers. Local governments 
that were established in these contexts thus had very little authority in their own 
right. They were sandwiched in between the central state and local populations, 
lacking both the coercive power and resources of the central state and the inde-
pendent mobilisation capacity of local gatekeepers. 
Second, since central governments did not materially benefit from decentrali-
sation (other than through the injection of donor financing) they had every reason 
to prevent local governments from evolving into independent centres of political 
power. Parallel to decentralisation, state bureaucracies multiplied the number of 
administrative units, which allowed them to supply patronage positions for their 
local supporters and outweigh pressures (Grossman and Lewis 2014). Central gov-
ernment’s most powerful lever, and up until now the greatest constraint on the 
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autonomy of local governments, is central–local fiscal relations. The slow pace of 
expenditure approvals from fiscal oversight authorities and a lack of predictable 
revenues are hamstringing local governments’ planning and implementation of 
projects. Insufficient capacity for procurement and fiscal management at the local 
level continues to provide central governments with justifications for limiting the 
fiscal autonomy of local ones. As efforts to resolve these issues remain only sluggish, 
regional inequalities persist – and the performance of local governments continues 
to disappoint.   
Third, the problems that prevented national-level political institutions from 
functioning like their equivalents in advanced, industrialised democracies naturally 
also occurred at the local level too. The clientelism and public sector patronage 
that undermine the effectiveness of centralised bureaucracies endure in decentral-
ised systems. Elected local politicians are often poorly qualified to oversee local 
bureaucracies, and it is easier for them to collude with corrupt bureaucrats than it 
is to defend the interests of their constituents (Raffler 2018). Political competition 
continues to be shaped by national-level divides, especially in ethnically polarised 
countries. If anything, decentralisation has allowed political parties to establish 
 regional or ethnic strongholds – where they are quasi-hegemonic. In most local 
elections political competition therefore remains weak, and decentralisation does 
not lead to greater electoral accountability.
Thus, these decentralisation reforms failed to have their intended effect – 
 namely, bringing government closer to the people – because they were based on 
unrealistic assumptions about the nature of state authority in peripheral areas 
 (Englebert and Mungongo 2016). Central governments either had no actual  political 
control over local affairs that they could have ceded to local governments, or had no 
political incentives to do so. As local governments had little institutional legitimacy 
of their own, they also had no political commitment to serve their constituents – 
and focused their efforts instead on administrating themselves. National politicians 
benefitted from exploiting the patronage opportunities associated with decentrali-
sation, but otherwise had every reason to keep local governments weak, so that 
they would not evolve into hotbeds of political opposition. Worse still, the more 
it became apparent that local governments had failed to deliver on their mandate, 
the easier it became for central governments to resist the actual transfer of political 
power. Rather than fostering the development of a “local state” able to effectively 
serve the population, decentralisation reforms instead replicated and perhaps even 
exacerbated problems of state capacity and state legitimacy at the local level. 
Improving Governance in Africa
The three examples mentioned in the preceding discussion – transparency and ac-
countability interventions, participatory governance, and decentralisation  reforms – 
highlight the pitfalls of attempting to change the political reality in Africa to con-
form to idealised conceptions of good governance. Assumptions about governance 
that may seem perfectly plausible in the context of advanced, industrialised democ-
racies miss the realities on the ground in many of Africa’s weaker and more fragile 
states:  
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 • Corruption, for example, does not have to be hidden from public view, if those 
who commit it can count on impunity. Transparency interventions miss the 
point if they are based on the assumption that citizens would collectively 
 address their grievances if only they were sufficiently informed about them. 
 • Citizen and civil society participation, as encouraged by international donors 
and NGOs to increase the legitimacy of public decisions, falls flat in  political sys-
tems where political authority remains personalised and sustained by  clientelism. 
 • Decentralisation reforms, promoted as a way of bringing government closer 
to the people, have exposed the weakness of many African states as if under 
a magnifying glass. States that previously failed to serve their citizens did not 
begin to perform better just because a parallel layer of local government institu-
tions was established. 
What, then, can be done to improve governance in Africa? For policymakers, the 
first implication of these findings is to avoid misdiagnosing governance failures. 
Analyses of governance problems must not be limited to formal institutions and 
accountability structures, but should rather seek to understand how public decision 
makers instrumentalise formal institutions for their own private interests – and 
how informal power structures enable them to do so with impunity. Many well-
meaning approaches to governance reform presuppose that legal norms and formal 
institutions are the primary sources of citizens’ rights, and of constraints on the dis-
cretion of officeholders. In Africa’s predominantly weak and fragile states, however, 
this fact cannot be taken for granted. 
Second, one should not discount the power of informal norms and institutions 
to constrain corruption and abuses of power. The reality in many African countries 
is that public decision makers can bend formal rules with impunity, but not every-
where and at all times. Whether or not public officials can get away with  corruption 
and abuse of office is not the salient question here; often enough, they can. Much 
more important is a better understanding of how much corruption will be  tolerated 
in a particular setting, and why. What is off limits for politicians and public 
 servants? under what conditions do political parties and patronage networks stop 
protecting their members? How much power do political leaders need to share with 
rival political communities and ethnic groups? When do citizens protest? When are 
they willing to express disagreement within the political process, rather than avoid-
ing dealing with the state? Questions like these require substantial research and 
thought, but they can be starting points for designing governance reforms that are 
more in line with current realities. 
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